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Abstract 
 
Price level and price transparency are input to shippers’ choice of supply chain and 
transport mode.  In this paper, we analyse current port pricing structures in the light of 
the pricing literature and consider opportunities for improvement. We present a 
detailed overview of pricing criteria, who sets prices and who ultimately foots the bill 
for port-of-call charges, cargo-handling fees and congestion charges.  Current port 
pricing practice is based on a rather linear structure and fails to incorporate modern 
pricing tools such as price differentiation or revenue management. Consequently, 
ports apply neither profit maximising pricing nor pricing designed to exploit available 
capacity more efficiently. 
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Introduction 
The complexity of current port pricing schemes is striking.  When calling at a port, 
ship operators are commonly presented with a detailed menu of services. Prices reflect 
the diversity that exists in terms of the kind of services and service standards offered, 
as well as the port entities or operators offering them, and whether the supplier is a 
private firm or a public infrastructure provider.  The result is an opaque price structure 
that complicates ship operators’ and cargo owners´ port choice and hence softens port 
competition (and competition among container lines). 
Such multi-pricing structures reflect the fact that ports are complex service centres 
offering a considerable range of service products.  The associated costs are usually 
arranged in three categories: port-calling costs, terminal-handling costs and 
concession pricing.  By port-calling costs, we mean costs of all services offered to the 
vessel, ranging from access to quay or terminal, to pilotage, to the supply of water and 
bunkering, i.e. they encompass all ship-handling costs.  Terminal-handling costs 
comprise costs for loading or unloading, storage, customs clearance, repacking and 
forwarding, i.e. they cover all services required for moving the cargo onwards through 
the port and down the supply chain.  By terminal concession costs, we mean the cost 
of acquiring a dedicated terminal. 
The focus on port operations, functioning and competitiveness has increased in recent 
times in consequence of stiffer competition between alternative supply chains in trade 
and transport, the high alternative costs of seashore areas, the high infrastructure cost 
of ports1 and, last but not least, the long-lived but hitherto rather unsuccessful policy 
of moving cargo transport off congested roads and onto sea and rail.  
 
Price level and price transparency are input to shippers’ choice of supply chain and 
transport mode.  In this paper, we analyse current port pricing structures, in order to 
gain insight into the link with the pricing literature and possible opportunities for 
improvement. The structure of this paper is as follows. We first explain the 
heterogeneous nature of the port system. Subsequently, after a review of the port 
pricing literature, a detailed analysis is presented of the current port pricing structure. 
Finally, the current pricing structure is linked to pricing models. 
 
Seaports: a heterogeneous network of entities 
 
No two seaports are physically and economically the same. Therefore, each economic 
and/or pricing analysis should start from the port as a physical entity, taking into 
account the various activities: facilitating the loading/unloading of vessels, freight 
handling and storage, and transportation to the hinterland. Clearly these are quite 
diverse activities, which combine to make port services a heterogeneous product, 
involving multifarious operations (Pauwels et.al, 2009). 
Moreover, any port activity should fit as perfectly as possible into the logistics chain 
of which seaports are an integral part. Hence successful seaports are essentially 
characterised by four important parameters: their maritime connection (e.g. the 
possibility of handling large vessels); actual freight handling (including 
                                                 
1 This paper discusses pricing of port services for a given capacity. It does not discuss port investment 
appraisal. 
stripping/stuffing activities); data handling; and hinterland connectivity. The port 
product may thus be regarded as a chain of interconnected functions, while the port as 
such is a link in that global logistics chain (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). 
Port operations involve a great many players, both at management level and at 
operational level. These positions may be combined in a single company (as in some 
privately owned ports in the UK) or they may act separately from each other. The port 
as a physical entity is managed by a port authority in which the public authorities may 
or may not be a stakeholder. In addition, depending on the size of the port, any 
number of enterprises may be located within its perimeter. Figure 1 offers an 
overview of the various market players within a port, indicating who provides services 
to whom (Meersman, Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009). The diagram confirms 
that shipping companies in particular rely on services provided by third parties (e.g. 
pilots, towage services, ship repairers, provisioning, waste reception facilities, and 
bunkering companies).  
The large number of parties involved in port activities, each of which pursues its own 
objectives, gives rise to a considerable degree of heterogeneity, both within the port 
and between ports . Hence, a generalised comparison between ports makes little sense. 
Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that different ports often 
work under different economic, legal, social and tax regimes (Meersman, Van de 
Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009). 
The consequences for anyone wishing to investigate port pricing are clear to see: there 
is no such thing as a single pricing scheme, as all the actors involved are focused on 
their own cost structure and thus exhibit individual pricing behaviour. 
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Figure 1: Subprocesses of cargo throughput, from a commodity-flow point of view 
 
 
 
Source: Meersman et al (2009) 
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Pricing principles 
 
Transport costs constitute a sizeable portion of the end value of any product that is 
traded over some distance.  The transport revolution has made conveyance affordable 
to a wider range of goods and consumers, and has thus contributed to and facilitated 
the steady rise in world trade.  On the other hand, Hummels (2007) finds that sea 
cargo has not experienced the strong reduction in transport costs that is usually 
assumed to have occurred as a result of containerisation.   Until the mid 1980s, higher 
fuel costs and port charges wiped out any efficiency gains due to containerisation. 
Today, the decline in transport costs in international shipping since the 1980s is 
largely or even completely cancelled out by rising port congestion costs following the 
strong growth that has occurred recently in transport volumes (Meersman et al, 2012).   
It is often argued that transport costs generally constitute such a small portion of the 
value of the goods that formal analysis is not worthwhile (see for example Dowd and 
Fleming, 1994).  If this is so for the total transport costs, then the level and structure 
of separate components of those costs, such as port dues and cargo-handling charges, 
are also of little relevance to decision-makers. Container shipping operators may 
indeed present examples of globally traded products where the cost of the sea leg 
represents less than 1 % of the value of the goods, the implication being that it makes 
much more sense to focus on other cost elements.  On the other hand, Clark, Dollar 
and Micco (2002) refer to data from the World Bank indicating that transport costs are 
on the rise in many areas of trade, especially in the context of developing countries.  
Although most traded goods may be inelastic in their demand for the sea leg, port 
pricing is by no means an irrelevance.  Non-traded goods or goods originating in new 
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sites may be sensitive to changes in transport costs even if traded goods are less 
sensitive.   
Pricing of elements in the transport chain will reflect the competitive setting in these 
submarkets and may therefore allocate the gains from trade and transport in a way that 
mirrors market power rather than just the value added at each step in the production 
process and supply chain.  Clark, Dollar and Micco (2002), who analyse the 
importance of distance and transport costs for the international flow of goods out of 
and into Latin American countries, find that trade flows are especially sensitive to 
port efficiency.  They link port efficiency to regulations, organised crime and general 
infrastructure. If better structured port charges are introduced, the incentives to 
increase port efficiency may also be enhanced, which may in turn remove important 
obstacles to trade. 
Several studies of current practice in port pricing exist. The seminal analysis in 
Bennathan and Walters (1979) presents a set of principles for port pricing. In another 
paper, Martinéz-Budria et. al (2001) estimate the effects across ports of the unified 
charging structure imposed on Spanish ports.  They find that the price structure is not 
neutral across ports and hence that revenues accrued to the individual ports are 
reflective of traffic characteristics.  They also find that the marginal revenue is higher 
for general cargo than for bulk cargoes, and that ports gain more from external than 
from coastal trade flows, while the unloading of goods is also relatively more 
lucrative than the loading of goods.  This is consistent with the practice of charging 
more for international than for national trade, i.e. higher charges for imports than for 
exports.   
Most existing studies analyse pricing from the perspective of port operators.  The aim 
is to obtain efficient infrastructure prices that cover costs in seaports, so that neither 
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the local authorities nor the state need subsidise port activities.  Since important cost 
elements in seaports display strong economies of scale, straightforward marginal cost 
pricing will induce losses.  Bergantino (2002) analyses EU policy papers on transport 
infrastructure and points out that the EU is changing its port charging policy with the 
aim of facilitating shipping: by increasing port efficiency, one hopes to enhance the 
attractiveness of shipping relative to other modes of transport. To this end, the EU has 
introduced the principle that users should, irrespective of mode, pay the full social 
marginal costs of transport infrastructure. Such a policy might increase cost for road 
relative to sea.   
Fung et al (2003) estimate the shift induced by the replacement of all-inclusive 
container freight rates with port-to-port freight rate and a terminal-handling cost 
(THC) levied directly on the shipper by the conference line. In so doing, they adopt 
the perspective of the shipper and the shipowner rather than that of the port.  They 
find that splitting the freight costs into two elements increased the total revenue of the 
shipping line, despite a reduction in freight rates over that same period.  They 
conclude that liner conferences are better at enforcing the collectively set THC than 
freight rates. However, important questions remain unanswered, including whether 
the THC system provokes a transfer from port to shipping line. 
There exists an extensive body of papers discussing and suggesting various port 
pricing structures.  Several of these studies are reviewed by Strandenes and Marlow 
(2000), who categorise the approaches taken as (1) cost-based pricing (e.g. Button, 
1979); (2) methods for cost recovery (e.g. Gilman, 1978, Meyerick, 1989, Talley, 
1994,  Bergantino, 1977 and 2000); (3) congestion pricing2 (e.g. Jansson and Rydén, 
                                                 
2 In addition, Laih et al (2003) link port queue pricing to shipping lines’ reactions. They demonstrate  
that container ships that pay the queuing toll are those who altered their original arrival times at the port 
before the toll was established. 
 9 
 
1979, Vanags, A. H., 1977,); (4) strategic port pricing (Arnold, 1985, UNCTAD 
1995);  or (5) quality pricing (Strandenes and Marlow, 2000). 
Port pricing issues are often analysed in the context of port revenue and cost recovery.  
Pricing schemes may be designed to enhance efficiency, for example by impacting on 
queuing in ports. Dasgupta and Ghosh (2000) show that port prices can indeed induce 
performance in a queue.  In a subsequent paper, Ghosh (2002) considers the use of the 
standard sequential English auction to regulate the queue for berth slots. This setup 
assumes that all ships favour the same time slot and agree on the ranking of the 
available slots. Strandenes and Wolfstetter (2005), however,  argue that the queuing 
problems in ports differs from this traditional impatience assumption.  Ships trade in 
different schedules, hence the most attractive slot will not be the same for all vessels. 
They therefore propose an auction procedure that solves the problem of scheduling in 
ports.  The mechanism yields non-negative shadow prices and allows for a forward 
market in port slots.  Alvarez et al (2010) simulate the reduction in dwell times, 
cancellations, fuel consumption and contractual penalties that can result from a policy 
of guaranteed access to the berth at the estimated arrival time for the vessel.  While 
they do not link the allocation to the port pricing schemes, their results point at the 
kind of gains better allocation of port capacity may offer. 
Efficiency in the supply chain will also increase if the port employs a price structure 
that is set up to optimise truck arrivals.  Xiaoming et al (2011)  assess the effects of 
introducing time-varying congestion tolls to influence trucks’ arrival times.  They 
develop a model to determine the best time-varying toll pattern, while at the same 
time minimising the average toll. It may be worthwhile also to apply time-dependent 
queuing models with a time-varying port tariff pattern to allocate port capacity to 
vessels. 
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Ven Reeven (2010) analyses differences between port organisation models in terms of  
the price level implemented.  Applying an oligopoly model with horizontal 
differentiation among ports, the author finds that a landlord or vertically separated 
port yields the highest profit for the port authorities and the highest prices for 
customers.  Even when the landlord port allows for intra-port competition among the 
service providers the prices and the profit gained by the port authority lies above the 
prices charged and profit gained in a port organised as a service or vertically 
integrated port. The effect of separation on prices follows from the complementarity 
between the port authority and service providers in a landlord port. Separate firms 
offering complementary products ignore the effects of their mark-up on the other 
producer.  This inevitably differs from the policy pursued in a service port, where the 
total mark-up effect is internalised. The higher profit follows, as in this model the 
prices set by the competing ports serving an overlapping hinterland are strategic 
complements.  Hence, a price hike for one port induces a higher price in the other 
port. Landlord ports may introduce competition among the service providers in the 
port, but given the above results the ports have no incentive to introduce such intra-
port competition.   
The next chapter deals with the prevailing port pricing structure and evaluates it in the 
light of alternative pricing models and methodologies. The research should help 
answer the questions of who makes the pricing decisions and who foots the bill, and 
offer a better understanding of which variables codetermine the price level.  
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The prevailing port pricing structure 
In order to prepare a port pricing typology, we distinguish between port-of-call 
pricing, terminal-handling pricing, and concession pricing. For each of these aspects, 
we make a further distinction between who is pricing, who is paying, and the manner 
in which the price is calculated (i.e. the variable(s) used for pricing). Obviously the 
price a port user must pay is a cost to that specific user and hence a basic determinant 
of that user’s own pricing behaviour. 
Due account should be taken of the type of operation involved (e.g. container liner 
traffic, bulk and industrial shipping), the vessel type (i.e. in terms of size and draught), 
and other relevant variables. Hence it soon becomes apparent that port pricing is 
rather a complicated matter. Quite illustrative in this respect is the relationship 
between carrier, stevedore and the shipper or consignee in respect of terminal pricing 
in container transport. What follows summarises the various pricing steps in the case 
of container transport: 
 The stevedore will demand from the carrier or shipping line a price per 
container move, or per two moves;3 
 The carrier will demand from the shipper or consignee an ocean freight to 
compensate for the maritime transport between origin and destination, and 
usually also including (normal) handling in both ports; the ocean freight level 
                                                 
3 It is better not to use the concept of a ‘shipowner’. In most cases, the shipping line is not actually the 
owner of the vessel. Therefore ‘carrier’ or ‘shipping line’ will be used. 
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should cover both the fixed (capital) and variable (operating, cargo handling 
etc.) costs of the carrier.4 
Moreover, in the case of container transport, the carriers will additionally demand that 
the shipper or consignee pay Terminal Handling Charges (THCs) 5; The level of 
THCs is a continuing source of dispute. Is there any relationship between the amount 
due in ocean freight and the level of THC? May THC be regarded as a surcharge on 
ocean freight? Are THCs an instrument whereby carriers are able to cream off the 
consumer surplus of the shipper or consignee? 
Not all ports apply the same pricing structure. In some ports, THCs are paid directly 
to the stevedore, without involvement of the carrier, as the example of the port of 
Casablanca (Morocco) illustrates. Here, stevedoring and stacking are paid for directly 
and in their entirety  by the shipper or consignee. The carrier pays nothing at land side 
and hence no THCs apply.  
Tables 1 to 3 provide a generic overview of the current port pricing structure. It 
distinguishes between the various activities, who is setting the price level, who is 
paying, and the variable(s) determining the price level. 
The table is conceived as a general framework. Obviously there will be differences 
between ports and port actors in terms of how the various elements apply. Let us 
illustrate this with the case of the agents. Agents can act independently or as an 
                                                 
4 The recipient of the goods acts on behalf of the owner of the goods. In some cases, ownership of the 
goods may change during the transportation process The owner (recipient) of the goods will pay 
directly to the customs broker only for clearance. 
5 Carriers are quite inventive when it comes to adding charges to the ocean freight. They all started 
from an ocean freight they deemed to constitute the shippers’ share of the port costs. In the meantime, 
however, there appears to be a trend towards THCs that are significantly higher than the actual 
stevedoring costs. Carriers often determine THCs according  to their own criteria, and the shippers or 
consignees are required to pay. The actual THC being paid by the carrier to the stevedores in the port is 
determined under the service contract agreed upon between shipping lines and ports (usually more 
favourable to the carriers as more containers are loaded and discharged at the terminal).  
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‘owner’s agent’. In the former case, they will be paid for specific tasks and actions, 
such as: 
 Generating freight volume (known as ‘canvassing’), at a price negotiated with 
the client/shipowner, a commission of which is due to the agent; the 
commission usually amounts to between 5 and 10%, depending on the contract 
with the shipowner and the total volume involved; 
 Additional tasks, such as liaising with the ship broker’s clerk, whose job it is 
to arrange berths, pilotage, towage… 
The freight price is payable to the agent by the owner of the goods or by his/her 
representative, who in exchange receives a tradable Bill of Lading (B/L). Payment by 
the agent to the carrier or the shipping line will ensue within the next twenty days. 
This way, a major agent applying good daily cash management can generate 
substantial revenues. 
Some carriers or shipping lines have their own agents, in order to avoid dependence 
on third parties. In such arrangements, the carrier does not pay a fee to the agent per 
job performed, but rather a lump sum per year. Such a pricing model arguably creates 
less incentives to perform well. 
For most port actors, the port pricing structure is less complicated than in the case of 
agents. Tables 1 to 3 provide an overview.
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Table 1: Port of call pricing 
Activity Who is pricing? Who is 
paying? 
Variable(s) applied 
Port dues 
 
 Tonnage dues 
 
 
 Mooring dues 
 
port authority Shipping line  
 
Gross tonnage (vessel) 
 
Load (ton) 
Pilotage 
 
 Sea pilotage 
 
 
 River pilotage 
 
 
 
 Dock pilotage 
 
 
 
Government 
 
 
Government 
 
 
 
Port authority (plus 
shipowners 
association(s)) 
Shipping line  
 
Draught (entering and 
leaving) 
 
Draught (entering and 
leaving), and distance 
 
Length of the vessel 
plus distance 
Towage 
 
 River tugboat 
 
 
 
 
 Port tugboat 
 
 
Private company 
 
 
 
 
Port authority 
 
 
Shipping line 
 
 
Length of the vessel 
plus distance 
 
Gross tonnage plus 
distance 
Agency costs Shipping agents Shipping line Job-by-job fee in case 
of independent agent; 
lump sum in case of 
ship owner’s agent 
Other costs 
 
 berthing/unberthing 
 
 
 
 ship reporting 
 
 
Private company (can 
be linked to port 
authority 
 
Private company (or 
port authority) 
 
 
Shipping line 
 
 
Shipping line 
 
 
Per port call 
 
 
 
Per port call 
Port state control n.a. government Condition of the vessel 
Waste reception facilities Service company Shipping line Quantity and type of 
waste 
Bunkering Bunker supplier Shipping line Quotation international 
markets; quantity 
supplied; number of 
bunkers a year 
Supplies (water, electricity 
etc.) 
Supplier (may be 
private company, port 
authority, or 
government 
Shipping line Quantity supplied 
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Table 2: Handling pricing 
 
 
Activity Who is pricing? Who is paying? Variable(s) applied 
Cargo handling on quay TOC6 Shipping line 
through its agent 
if terms of sale 
are liner terms. 
Recipient 
depends on the 
contract (free 
out) 
Per weight (tons) or 
movements 
(containers) 
Transport to/from storage TOC 
Carrier if cargo is 
transported to 
storage area outside 
the terminal 
premises 
Shipping line or 
receiver 
depending on the 
terms of sale (see 
above)owner 
Per weight (tons) or 
movements 
(containers) 
Storage TOC Recipient of the 
goods 
Per unit of weight (ton 
of TEU) and time (cf. 
dwell time) 
Delivery/receiving TOC Recipient of the 
goods 
Per unit weight or TEU
Cargo moving inland Inland transport 
operator (rail 
operator, barge, 
truck) 
If carrier 
haulage: 
shipping line; 
If merchant 
haulage: the 
recipient of the 
goods  
Per TEU unit or per ton
Customs Customs authority Owner of the 
goods via 
customs broker 
According to value of 
goods and customs 
clarification 
Handling of empty boxes TOC Shipping line Per box 
Storing of empty boxes TOC Shipping line or 
leasing company 
if boxes out of 
lease 
Per box and dwell time 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 TOC stands for Terminal Operating Company (or stevedore) 
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Table 3: Concession pricing 
 
 
Activity Who is pricing? Who is paying? Variable(s) applied 
Granting concession Port authority (i.e. 
market-based, after 
tendering) 
Concessionaire 
(stevedore, 
industry, …) 
Size of the area, 
location, facilities,… 
 
 
So what do we learn from these tables? Within a port context, the carrier is billed by 
the port authority, the agents, stevedores, government and all other service providers.7 
These payments may be regarded as ‘out-of-pocket’ costs borne by the carrier. 
Obviously, to a carrier, this port-of-call cost is an important consideration in setting 
the price for the end client, i.e. the owner of the goods and/or the forwarder.  
Figure 2 visualises the relationships between who sets and who pays the different 
fees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In a number of cases, the agent may act as the sole representative of the carrier and pay/collect all 
bills. Ultimately, the agent bills the carrier for all costs associated with the port call. 
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Figure 2: Pricing and payment of port bills 
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Port Pricing Models 
The short-run marginal cost is always the appropriate base for pricing, irrespective of 
the existence of any under- or overcapacity. The aim of pricing is to confront the user 
with the additional costs that he/she causes. Only the short-run marginal cost indicates 
precisely the difference in costs between acceptance and refusal of an additional user. 
In a port context, it sometimes may make sense to charge for the long-run marginal 
cost. If one equates prices to the short-run marginal cost, we risk to get strong 
variations over time, with different rates for peak and off-peak periods (e.g. function 
of tides), different prices in the high and the low season. Moreover, transport prices 
will also fluctuate over the years. With growing demand, prices will increase, up to 
the point when an investment is made in new capacity, after which prices will 
suddenly decline8. Such a strong differentiated and fluctuating tariff, though desirable 
from the perspective of economic allocation, may meet with resistance for political 
and/or organizational reasons. It may therefore be deemed necessary to impose prices 
that remain constant for some time. This price should then be a kind of average of the 
short-run marginal cost at different moments. This average can be approximated by 
the long-run marginal cost (for a detailed analysis of the short run versus long run 
pricing discussion see Meersman et al (2010)). 
 
Pricing and revenue optimisation incorporates costs, customer demand (or willingness 
to pay), and the competitive environment in determining the prices that maximise 
expected net contribution. Table 4 summarises the alternative approaches to pricing. 
                                                 
8 Port expansion for instance takes a long time (in some cases several years) and in construction and 
operations there may be large discontinuities. In case of such discontinuous jumps, the long- and short-
run marginal costs will coincide for wide ranges of output from a a port or terminal of fixed capacity. 
Pricing based on long-run marginal cost can be acceptable for all output levels if one does not operate 
too small or too large a port or terminal (Meersman et al, 2010). 
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Table 4: Alternative approaches to pricing 
Approach Based on Ignores Liked by 
Cost-plus Costs Competition, 
customers 
Finance 
Market-based Competition Cost, customers Sales 
Value-based Customers Cost, competition Marketing 
Source: Phillips, 2005, p. 22. 
Cost-plus pricing, a very simple method, calculates prices based on cost plus a 
standard margin. Market-based pricing bases prices on what competitors are doing, 
and is often used in markets in which there is a clear market leader. Value-based 
pricing sets prices based on an estimate of how clients ‘value’ the services sold. 
So how does this apply to the real world of port pricing? The current pricing 
behaviour of port actors cannot be reduced exclusively to any one of these traditional 
pricing approaches. The generic port pricing structure follows a linear pricing 
structure. It is in most cases based on easily measurable units: the vessel and the 
vessel size in the case of a port call, the number of tons and/or TEUs if it concerns 
handling and storage operations. In some instances, elements may be added that result 
in non-linear pricing, such as the application of surcharges (BAF and CAF). Port 
pricing is complicated, though this complexity is due more to the heterogeneous 
nature of port activities and port actors than to the price-setting mechanism as such.  
Port prices involve a somewhat complex set of decisions, including a multitude of 
discounts, adjustments and rebates. Consequently, it is critical to distinguish between 
the list price of a service and its so-called ‘pocket price’, which is the actual price that 
a particular port user (e.g. a shipowner) ends up paying. The list price is generic, 
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while the pocket price may be different for each customer (Phillips, 2005, p. 18). This 
obviously contributes to the non-transparency of port costs. 
All carriers aim to maximise profits. Their pricing behaviour is based on that ultimate 
aim. However, this is not always the case for other port actors. The behaviour of a 
port authority, for example, may be determined not so much by profit maximisation as 
by other considerations, such as  maximisation of throughput, employment and/or 
value added (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). A similar reasoning applies to port 
activities such as pilotage and towage. The terminal operating business, meanwhile, 
has moved towards an economic structure with a limited number of major players 
acting at a global scale. This seems rather far removed from the textbook situation of 
a perfectly competitive market. 
So what might an alternative pricing strategy look like? One possibility is price 
differentiation, a concept applied by most port actors, including port authorities and 
TOCs. Price differentiation refers to the practice of a service provider charging 
different prices to different customers, either for exactly the same service or for a 
slightly differentiated one. It is a powerful way for sellers to improve profitability, and 
can be time-based and/or volume-based. Volume discounts are often applied on the 
total yearly volume, rather than on the size of a single call, thereby introducing 
deferred discounts and customer lock-in. Pricing may be non-linear, i.e. the total price 
paid may not be a linear function of the number of units loaded and/or unloaded. 
The increasing tendency towards price differentiation might be occasioned by 
ongoing evolutions in the structure of the port market. In the container business, 
shipping lines are now cooperating in so-called strategic alliances. The terminal 
operating business has globalised and is now dominated by a limited number of large 
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companies (PSA, Hutchison, DP World,…). As a result, certain types of negotiation, 
including over the price of port handling, now commonly unfold in a context of a 
bilateral oligopoly. In some of Europe’s principal container ports, the major 
client/shipping line accounts for over half the boxes handled.9 There is no doubt that 
in certain negotiations, especially between shipping lines and terminal operating 
companies, so-called ‘customised pricing’ is applied. Under such a scenario, potential 
clients (i.e. shipping lines) approach potential sellers (i.e. a TOC as the service 
provider) one by one and ask them to quote a price for a well-defined assignment. 
Each potential client may have different specifications, hence the seller may quote a 
different price for different requests. This price may be determined by the relationship  
with the client, the precise nature of the services required by the shipping line, and a 
variety of other factors, including general market conditions and competitive offerings 
(Phillips, 2005, p. 164). 
Demand for port calls may be (temporarily) confronted with port capacity constraints. 
In any situation where there is a significant likelihood that demand will exceed 
available supply, such constraints need to be explicitly acknowledged in setting the 
optimal price. However, that principle would appear not to be universally applied in 
the port business. Advanced price-setting systems, such as revenue management, are 
not yet widely implemented. The auction scheme proposed by Strandenes and 
Wolfstetter (2005) also provides ports with the option of selling port slots forward. 
This way, the port may become better informed on future demand. 
One may wonder why, in a port context, price setting is not based on revenue 
management techniques. After all, most port activities are service tasks that meet the 
                                                 
9 One example by way of illustration: in 2011 the port of Antwerp recorded a total container throughput 
of 8,662,035 TEU, 55 % of which was transported by the MSC shipping line  
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conditions for effective revenue management. Capacity is limited and immediately 
perishable; an unused handling ‘slot’ at a terminal cannot be stored to satisfy future 
demand; and shipowners need to ensure ahead of time that capacity will be available 
when they need it. This creates opportunities for port authorities and service providers 
to track future demand for capacity and to adjust prices accordingly in order to 
balance supply and demand.10  
However, in the current port context there are a number of pending issues that give 
rise to disincentives to opt for revenue management. First of all, quite a lot of ports 
and port actors face considerable problems of overcapacity (see a.o. Liu and Medda, 
2009). The port container business is an apt example, with overcapacity at both the 
carriers’ and the TOCs’ side. This excess capacity may reflect the need to limit 
waiting times for important/large carriers.  If so, however, this constitutes quite a 
costly way of securing prompt service for those carriers that the port deems to be of 
strategic importance and which it is therefore keen not to see switching to another 
port.  The capital invested in the overcapacity and excess port area is associated with 
an alternative cost that is usually high. This is especially true for  ports located in 
cities, where land is scarce and therefore expensive.  
Moreover, port authorities and port actors have an incentive to try and ‘capture’ 
important clients, as this will make their own market more stable. In some cases, they 
try to do so by negotiating package deals and long-term prices. In a future bilateral 
oligopolistic environment - involving strategic alliances between shipping lines and 
                                                 
10 Pricing and revenue management is a tactical function, linked to the fact that prices need to change 
rapidly and frequently. Hence, the purpose is to exploit price variations  and to signal constrained 
capacity instead of the more common practice of making vessels wait ashore for access.  This is 
different from strategic pricing, where the goal is usually to assume a position within a marketplace. 
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large TOCs - such package deals may be expected to extend beyond a single port, and 
perhaps even across continents. 
 
Conclusions 
Port pricing is a very complicated matter. It is also an area lacking in transparency. 
This might explain why little research has hitherto been devoted to trying to 
understand the structures underlying port pricing strategies and the behaviour of the 
actors setting port-of-call-related prices. 
This paper presents an analysis of current port pricing structures. These structures 
have, thus far,  been rather linear in nature, and they tend to ignore modern pricing 
tools proposed in the literature. On the other hand, they are not linked directly to 
traditional pricing approaches such as price differentiation (e.g. two-part tariff 
pricing) or revenue management. As a consequence, certain pricing opportunities, 
which could lead to profit maximisation and/or a better use of available capacity, are 
left unexploited. 
The ultimate aim of future research is to propose more effective pricing schemes  than 
are currently applied in order to facilitate shippers’ choice of transport mode and to 
enhance the competitiveness of ports.   
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